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INTRODUCTION 
Two conceptions of the class action have long motivated debates 
over its role in American civil litigation. Starting in the late 1960s, 
 
*   David Marcus is a Professor of Law at the University of California, Los Angeles. 
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Angeles. The authors are grateful for reactions to an earlier version of this essay that they 
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World. They also thank Steve Yeazell for stimulating some of this essay’s ideas. 
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proponents of the then-fledgling device advocated a “regulatory” 
understanding of its nature and purpose. As vehicles for law enfor-
cement, they argued, class actions succeed when they prohibit or 
deter widespread misconduct. Undue attention to the circum-
stances of individual class members and their claims interferes with 
class-wide proceedings and serves little legitimate purpose. Class 
action skeptics, by contrast, advanced a “conflict resolution” 
conception.1 To them, the class action does little more than join indi-
vidual claims for the purposes of adjudicative efficiency. Class-
wide litigation must respect preexisting features of these discrete 
claims, even if attention to them precludes class certification or 
otherwise creates considerable expense. 
Combatants in fights over class action law and policy continue 
to couch their arguments in regulatory and conflict resolution 
terms. But these conceptions have earned their retirement, at least 
as principled bases for doctrinal design. The claims that each 
conception supports are fundamentally incommensurate.2 To those 
convinced by the class action’s regulatory value, the fact that many 
cases generate little recovery for individual class members matters 
little. To those insistent that private litigation resolve genuine 
conflicts, whatever regulatory effect litigation has cannot justify a 
case that procures minimal relief for class members who barely 
know that they are injured. 
But the two conceptions have proven limited for a reason 
beyond the inconclusive normative combat they have fueled.3 A 
 
 1. In prior work, one of us used the term “adjectival conception.” David Marcus, The 
History of the Modern Class Action, Part II: Litigation and Legitimacy, 1981–1994, 86 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1785, 1809 (2018) [hereinafter Marcus, History Part II]. This term is less descriptive and 
dissimilar from what scholars of the time used. We therefore use a new one here. 
 2. Robert Bone describes the landscape of debates over class action law and policy 
by contrasting two competing “views” of the class action, but he uses different terms for 
them and describes them with more theoretical nuance than what I provide here. Still, the 
“internal” and “external” views, as he calls them, roughly correspond with the regulatory 
and conflict resolution conceptions. Robert G. Bone, The Misguided Search for Class Unity, 82 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 651, 651–53 (2014). Prof. Bone likewise describes “the powerful influence 
on the shape of modern class action law” that the “two views of the class” he describes have 
had. Id. at 653. We agree with Professor Bone that “the two sides frequently talk past one 
another.” Id. at 654. 
 3. Cf. David Marcus, The History of the Modern Class Action, Part I: Sturm und Drang, 
1953–1980, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 587, 609 (2013)  [hereinafter Marcus, History Part I] (“Before 
the 1960s ended, the now-hardened battle lines in the war over Rule 23 formed, with clashes 
erupting over the same alleged legal and economic pathologies that fuel debates today.”). 
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proponent of a powerful class action cannot maintain a principled 
commitment to the regulatory conception and still argue consist-
ently for doctrine that empowers the device. Likewise, a class action 
skeptic cannot argue for the conflict resolution conception and 
consistently advocate for restraint in procedural doctrine. If these 
conceptions motivate doctrinal design, then either preference or 
principle must be sacrificed. 
We work through problems involving personal and subject 
matter jurisdiction in class actions to illustrate this claim. These 
problems warrant attention for two reasons. First, they remain 
unanswered, and thus this symposium essay can contribute to their 
resolution. The personal jurisdiction problem emerged abruptly in 
summer 2017 after the U.S. Supreme Court rejected a specific strain 
of personal jurisdiction doctrine for aggregate litigation in Bristol-
Myers Squibb Co. v. California Superior Court, San Francisco County 
(BMS).4 Defendants have seized on the decision to challenge a 
decades’ old consensus that personal jurisdiction in class actions 
depends on the relationship between the named plaintiff’s claim and 
the defendant’s forum contacts. Arguing that each class member’s 
claim must independently satisfy jurisdictional requirements, 
defendants hope to narrow the plaintiff’s choice of forum in 
multistate class actions considerably—an outcome that would have 
significant ramifications for the enforcement of state law through 
private litigation. The issue of BMS’s application in class actions  
has “preoccupied” the federal courts, generating considerable 
disagreement.5 
The subject matter jurisdiction problem has to do with Article 
III standing doctrine. Faced with inconclusive guidance from the 
Supreme Court, the lower federal courts have long struggled to 
fashion consensus answers to two related questions. Do differences 
between the named plaintiff’s injury and those suffered by absent 
class members deprive the former of standing to sue on the latter’s 
behalf? If so, when do such differences create jurisdictional 
 
 4. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773,1777 (2017). 
 5. McCurley v. Royal Sea Cruises, Inc., 331 F.R.D. 142, 164 (S.D. Cal. 2019).  As of the 
time of writing, the Fifth, Seventh, and D.C. Circuits are considering the issue but have not 
yet issued decisions.  D.C Circuit Wary of Putting Mass Tort Limit on Whole Foods Suit, LAW360 
(Sept. 25, 2019), https://www.law360.com/articles/1202715/dc-circ-wary-of-putting-mass-
tort-limit-on-whole-foods-suit. 
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problems? Some circuits insist that this “injury difference problem” 
requires a test for named plaintiff standing. Others deny that such 
differences require a standing analysis at all.6 
Our second reason for focusing on the personal and subject 
matter jurisdiction problems involves what we argue is the key to 
each one’s resolution. Both hinge on a determination of whether 
absent class members are juridically relevant, or whether absent class 
members are parties or share party-like features. As a doctrinal 
matter, this status changes depending on the procedural issue at 
stake.7 But courts have long expressed the sentiment that, whatever 
status an absent class member has for personal jurisdiction purposes, 
principled doctrinal design requires that she have the same status 
for subject matter jurisdiction purposes.8 After all, the doctrines 
share a “key feature”: “[E]ach governs a court’s ability, constitu-
tional or statutory, to adjudicate a particular person’s or entity’s 
claim against a particular defendant.”9 
The regulatory and conflict resolution conceptions seem 
obviously germane to the question of absent class member juridical 
relevance. Stressing the overall effect of litigation on the 
defendant’s behavior, the regulatory conception deemphasizes 
individual class member identity and thereby justifies a finding of 
juridical irrelevance. Conversely, the conflict resolution conception 
treats the class action as little more than a joinder device for discrete 
claims that are independently litigable. It supports a determination 
of absent class member juridical relevance. 
Here is where principle and preference collide. A proponent of 
a powerful class action can use the regulatory conception to justify 
a class action exception to BMS. If absent class members are 
juridically irrelevant, then only the named plaintiff’s claim remains 
as the basis for the personal jurisdiction determination. But the 
easiest answer to the injury difference problem requires that absent 
class members be juridically relevant. If so, then standing in class 
actions is no different than standing in other multiparty cases. 
Differences between the named plaintiff’s claim and the class 
 
 6. See infra notes 138–146 and accompanying text. 
 7. Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 9–10 (2002). 
 8. See Al Haj v. Pfizer, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 3d 815, 820 (N.D. Ill. 2018). For a pre-1966 
case to this effect, see Calagaz v. Calhoon, 309 F.2d 248, 254 (5th Cir. 1962). 
 9. Al Haj, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 820. 
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members’ claims may impact class certification under Rule 23. But 
these differences have no Article III implications. If, however, absent 
class members are juridically irrelevant for standing purposes, then 
the named plaintiff’s standing to represent others, however 
different or similar their claims, becomes harder to justify. A class 
action skeptic sits at the same crossroads. Juridical relevance raises 
personal jurisdiction barriers to litigation, but it lowers subject 
matter jurisdiction hurdles. 
The best answers to the two jurisdictional problems indeed 
align with preferences for liberality in class action doctrine. But a 
principled justification for juridical irrelevance in one jurisdictional 
context and juridical relevance in the other requires something other 
than an argument couched in regulatory or conflict resolution 
terms. A class action exception to BMS should exist, and the injury 
difference problem should not trigger standing problems most of 
the time. But these answers are right not because they best comport 
with an abstract conception of litigation fixed a priori, or because 
they posit a single juridical status for absent class members. Rather, 
the answers best serve the basic policies and goals that animate 
each line of jurisdictional doctrine. 
Our Essay proceeds as follows. In Part I, we describe the 
regulatory and conflict resolution conceptions, tracing their origins 
to theorizing about the nature and purposes of litigation that 
coincided with the class action’s emergence in the late 1960s. We 
delve into personal jurisdiction in Part II. We argue that a class 
action exception to BMS requires the juridical irrelevance of absent 
class members, a status that the regulatory conception supports. 
Part III turns to subject matter jurisdiction. We explain how the 
juridical relevance of absent class members, a status that the conflict 
resolution conception justifies, solves an Article III standing puzzle. 
Their juridical irrelevance, by contrast, creates difficult juris-
dictional problems. We conclude in Part IV. We argue against the 
continued use of the regulatory and conflict resolution conceptions 
as guides to doctrinal design, and we suggest a contextual, 
pragmatic way to make a principled argument in favor of a class 
action unencumbered by needless jurisdictional constraint. 
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I. MODELS OF LITIGATION AND CONCEPTIONS OF THE  
CLASS ACTION 
The competing conceptions of the class action are more 
particular versions of contrasting “models” of civil litigation that 
first appeared in 1960s-era procedural commentary. During a 
convulsive period for American civil justice that witnessed the 
modern class action’s emergence, participants in debates over 
litigation’s nature and purpose often cast their arguments in 
regulatory or conflict resolution terms. These models and the 
conceptions based on them continue to motivate arguments about 
procedural law and policy. 
As the landscape of American civil justice began to shift rapidly 
in the 1960s, a number of prominent scholars crafted models that 
tried to capture litigation’s essence.10 These models were similar to 
each other, and they all came in pairs. A representative one, which 
Kenneth Scott called the “conflict resolution” model,11 described 
litigation as a process for resolving disputes between private 
parties attempting to vindicate private rights.12 Its purpose, to 
restore peace to an “essentially harmonious” system, 13 has several 
implications for the process’s legitimate use. Cases must involve 
“concrete disputes.”14 This requirement limits litigation to those 
instances when social peace is genuinely threatened,15 incentivizes 
parties to control the proceedings, and restricts participation to a 
narrow set of individuals.16 To ensure that litigation restores and 
does not transform a social, political, or economic status quo, a 
lawsuit should be “bounded in effect[,]” and its impact should be 
“limited to the (two) parties before the court.”17 
 
 10. William A. Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution: Institutional Remedies and 
Judicial Legitimacy, 91 YALE L.J. 635, 636 n.4 (1982) (commenting on these efforts and linking 
them to changes to judicial practice). 
 11. Kenneth E. Scott, Two Models of the Civil Process, 27 STAN. L. REV. 937, 937 (1975). 
 12. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 
1282 (1976) [hereinafter Chayes, Role of the Judge]; Meir Dan-Cohen, Bureaucratic Organizations 
and the Theory of Adjudication, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 6 (1985); Paul Weiler, Two Models of Judicial 
Decision-Making, 46 CAN. B. REV. 406, 410 (1968). 
 13. Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 18 (1979). 
 14. Weiler, supra note 12, at 414. 
 15. Scott, supra note 11, at 937–38. 
 16. Abram Chayes, Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. 
REV. 4, 4–5 (1982) [hereinafter Chayes, Burger Court]; Weiler, supra note 12, at 414. 
 17. Chayes, Burger Court, supra note 16, at 5; see also Dan-Cohen, supra note 12, at 3. 
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We call the second the “regulatory” model, although no scholar 
at the time used precisely this term.18 This model attempted to 
capture the various developments—the nascent class action, 
legislated damages enhancements, fee-shifting provisions, the new 
multidistrict litigation system, and so forth19—that were expanding 
the footprint of American civil justice. Litigation does not merely 
restore social peace pursuant to “established rules and principles” 
of substantive law, as the conflict resolution model contemplated.20 
Rather, litigation qua a regulatory process furthers the design and 
administration of public policy.21 A lawsuit focuses not on 
“particularized and discrete events” concerning a limited set of 
private parties, but instead on a “social condition” that affects 
groups.22 Discrete individual parties do not control the litigation or 
serve as its exclusive subjects. Rather, “the party structure and the 
matter in controversy are both amorphous.”23 A case seeks 
prospectively-oriented remedies to vindicate the interests of 
undifferentiated beneficiaries.24 Accordingly, litigation implicates 
matters that extend well beyond “the effects of the decision on the 
parties before the court.”25 
Some scholars developed their versions of the paired models 
simply as aids in understanding the shifting sands of American 
civil justice.26 A normative tint colored others’ descriptive efforts. 
Some championed the regulatory model’s emergence,27 and others 
lamented it.28 
 
 18. Compare Chayes, Role of the Judge, supra note 12, at 1284 (“public law”), Dan-Cohen, 
supra note 12, at 3 (“regulation”), Scott, supra note 11, at 938 (“behavior modification”), and 
Weiler, supra note 12, at 407 (“policy-making”). 
 19. For histories of some of these developments, see generally SEAN FARHANG, THE 
LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE LAWSUITS IN THE U.S. (2010); Andrew 
D. Bradt, “A Radical Proposal”: The Multidistrict Litigation Act of 1968, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 831 
(2017); Marcus, History Part I, supra note 3. 
 20. Weiler, supra note 12; cf. Dan-Cohen, supra note 12, at 17 (noting that the arbitration 
model assumes a “sharp distinction” between judging and legislating). 
 21. Chayes, Burger Court, supra note 16, at 5; Dan-Cohen, supra note 12, at 4; Fiss, supra 
note 13, at 2; see Scott, supra note 11, at 938. 
 22. Fiss, supra note 13, at 18. 
 23. Chayes, Burger Court, supra note 16, at 5. 
 24. Id.; Fiss, supra note 13, at 19. 
 25. Dan-Cohen, supra note 12, at 3; accord Chayes, Burger Court, supra note 16, at 5. 
 26. See Scott, supra note 11, at 950; Weiler, supra note 12, at 471. 
 27. Chayes, Burger Court, supra note 16, at 7. 
 28. E.g., Simon H. Rifkind, Are We Asking Too Much of Our Courts?, 70 F.R.D. 96, 101; 
id. at 104. 
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This fight over litigation’s legitimate uses and purposes found 
concrete expression in disputes over the then-fledgling class 
action.29 In prior work, one of us described two conceptions of the 
class action, each connecting to one of the models, that crystallized 
as debates over class action law and policy proceeded in the late 
1960s and 1970s: 
To proponents of the regulatory conception, a class was not an 
assembly of discrete individuals, but a group of undifferentiated 
regulatory beneficiaries on whose behalf litigation pursues 
vindication of a substantive policy regime. The class action existed 
to mobilize claims. The civil rights litigators, plaintiffs’ lawyers, 
and progressive judges who advanced this view emphasized the 
regulatory efficacy of the substantive law, not individualized 
compensation for class members, as litigation’s goal. The 
regulatory conception provided a normative justification for a 
powerful class action device because it deemphasized differences 
among individual class members’ claims and the particular relief 
owed to them as subordinate to the regulatory imperative the 
class action furthered. 
Defense counsel, industry representatives, and others uncomfort-
able with powerful class action litigation argued for the [conflict 
resolution] conception. They viewed Rule 23 as a mere joinder 
device, no different in its essence than any of the other joinder 
rules, and certainly not a device with a particular regulatory 
mission. Rule 23 took the claims of otherwise disconnected 
individuals and allowed their assembly in one case for the sake of 
litigation efficiency. Individual relief remained the litigation’s 
primary goal, and any other benefits the class action might create 
were incidental.30 
Participants in debates over class action law and policy 
understood their preferences for an expansive or restrained device 
in terms of the two conceptions.31 A good example comes from an 
 
 29. E.g., Editor’s Forword to Kenneth E. Scott, Two Models of the Civil Process, 4 CLASS 
ACTION REPORTS, Jan.–Feb. 1975 at 51 (“[A]cceptance of the validity of the Behavior 
Modification Model is absolutely critical to the viability of the large class action lawsuit, 
which is in turn a necessary prerequisite for the viability of that model.”). 
 30. Marcus, History Part II, supra note 1 (footnotes omitted); see also Marcus, History 
Part I, supra note 3, at 593–94. 
 31. E.g., Chayes, Burger Court, supra note 16, at 28 (1982); Rifkind, supra note 28, at 102 
& n.7 (citing to doctrines that facilitate class actions as examples of a mentality favoring the 
use of courts as “problem-solvers”). 
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internecine fight within the American Bar Association over a set of 
proposed reforms to Rule 23 that gained considerable ground in the 
1980s before ultimately failing.32 The ABA formed a “Special 
Committee” to consider possibilities for class action reform. It 
recommended changes that would have facilitated class litigation 
by minimizing the relevance of class members’ individual 
circumstances to the class certification decision and by weakening 
participation rights for absent class members. “Central to the 
Committee’s recommendations,” its final report noted, was the 
conviction “that the class action is a valuable procedural tool 
affording significant opportunities to implement important public 
policies.”33 
The ABA’s Antitrust Section dissented from the recommenda-
tions. Although the Section challenged various specifics, it also 
faulted the Committee for taking sides in “a continuing and 
sometimes bitter debate” over “diametrically opposed views as to 
the fundamental purpose for which courts and private litigation 
exist.” One side, the Section explained, “argues that the purpose of 
private litigation should be to compensate injured parties”—a 
traditional role fitting the conflict resolution model. The Antitrust 
Section linked the Committee to the other side, or the view that 
“private litigation should serve a higher purpose than the 
compensation of victims, namely the deterrence of violations of 
law.”34 
As they did in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, the conflict 
resolution and regulatory models continue to motivate normative 
claims about procedural design and litigation’s proper use.35 The 
class action’s champions couch arguments in regulatory terms. 
 
 32. The ABA proposals went to the Federal Civil Rules Advisory Committee, which 
used them as a basis for a set of proposed reforms that only ran aground in 1994. Marcus, 
History Part II, supra note 1, at 1794–95. 
 33. Am. Bar Ass’n Section of Litig., Report and Recommendations of the Special Committee 
on Class Action Improvements, 110 F.R.D. 195, 198 (1986). 
 34. AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 
7–9 (1985) (on file with author). 
 35. See Chad M. Oldfather, Defining Judicial Inactivism: Models of Adjudication and the 
Duty to Decide, 94 GEO. L.J. 121, 153 (2005) (“[T]he classic and public law models represent 
the dominant conceptions of adjudication . . . .”). For other important modeling exercises, see 
Linda S. Mullenix, Resolving Aggregate Mass Tort Litigation: The New Private Law Dispute 
Resolution Paradigm, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 413, 414–15 (1999); Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 
96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982); William B. Rubenstein, A Transactional Model of Adjudication, 89 
GEO. L.J. 371 (2001). 
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Negative value cases win praise, for example, because they mobilize 
claims that would lie dormant and thereby vindicate substantive 
liability policy. They therefore incentivize better behavior through 
cost internalization.36 Those who aim to limit the class action’s use, 
on the other hand, argue for a conflict resolution conception.37 
Negative value class actions get faulted because they yield little of 
value to individual class members and arise from “faux” disputes 
involving no real injuries.38 
To the extent that each model or conception expresses a 
normative vision of what roles litigation can legitimately assume, 
they are incommensurate. Those committed to one of them are 
likely to find arguments that smack of the other fundamentally 
misguided or inapposite. Less appreciated are the limits to the 
normative direction that either conception can offer to doctrinal 
design. As a general matter, the regulatory conception correlates 
with doctrine that empowers the class action and the conflict 
resolution conception with doctrine that limits it. But this relation-
ship is not necessarily so, as the rest of this essay shows by working 
through the personal and subject matter jurisdiction problems. 
II. PERSONAL JURISDICTION, BRISTOL-MYERS,  
AND THE CLASS ACTION EXCEPTION 
Our argument for the two conceptions’ normative limits requires 
some doctrinal spadework. This Part asks whether the claims of 
absent class members matter to the determination of whether a 
defendant comes within the court’s personal jurisdiction, a 
question prompted by the 2017 BMS decision.39 A majority of lower 
 
 36. E.g., Myriam Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the Class Action Agency Costs 
Myth: The Social Utility of Entrepreneurial Lawyers, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 104–05 (2006). 
 37. Myriam Gilles, Class Dismissed: Contemporary Judicial Hostility to Small-Claims 
Consumer Class Actions, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 305, 319–22 (2010); Samuel Issacharoff, Class 
Actions and State Authority, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L. REV. 369, 383–90 (2012); see Martin H. Redish et 
al., Cy Pres Relief and the Pathologies of the Modern Class Action: A Normative and Empirical 
Analysis, 62 FLA. L. REV. 617, 622–23 (2010); cf. Robert G. Bone, Justifying Class Action Limits: 
Parsing the Debates Over Ascertainability and Cy Pres, 65 U. KAN. L. REV. 913, 953–54 (2017) 
(describing but not endorsing arguments couched in terms of the models). 
 38. Martin H. Redish, Class Actions and the Democratic Difficulty: Rethinking the Intersection 
of Private Litigation and Public Goals, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 71, 77–78 (2003). 
 39. Then-Professor Diane Wood addressed this issue in 1987. Diane P. Wood, 
Adjudicatory Jurisdiction and Class Actions, 62 IND. L.J. 597, 616–17 (1987). We are unaware of 
any serious engagement with it in the courts before BMS. See infra note 51. 
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federal courts have refused to apply BMS in class actions, thereby 
preserving the maximum jurisdictional reach for federal courts 
supervising class actions. But their justifications for this class action 
exception are thin. The regulatory conception can supply missing 
normative heft by justifying a status of juridical irrelevance for 
absent class members. 
A. BMS 
In BMS, several hundred plaintiffs, many of whom were 
residents of states other than California, sued Bristol-Myers in a 
California state court.40 They alleged injuries caused by their 
ingestion of Plavix, a blood-thinning drug. The plaintiffs’ similar 
cases, all filed by the same lawyers, got consolidated into a single 
episode of litigation. Initially, the California Supreme Court affirmed 
the trial court’s power to adjudicate the claims of other states’ 
residents based on a general jurisdiction theory.41 Bristol-Myers has 
extensive contacts with California, including hundreds of millions 
of dollars of Plavix sales and extensive research activities in the 
state.42 After a U.S. Supreme Court decision narrowed general 
jurisdiction’s boundaries, a California Court of Appeal revisited the 
matter and determined that the state court had specific jurisdiction 
over nonresidents’ claims.43 The California Supreme Court agreed. 
Bristol-Myers’s extensive engagement in California, if insufficient 
for general jurisdiction, warranted a looser connection between its 
California contacts and nonresidents’ claims. The company had 
targeted California as well as other states with a single, undiffer-
entiated marketing and sales campaign. All of the plaintiffs’ claims 
arose out of this conduct, even if some of them bought and used 
Plavix in other states. The non-residents’ claims thus related 
sufficiently to Bristol-Myers’s California contacts to meet the 
specific jurisdiction threshold.44 
The California Supreme Court abstracted away from the 
specifics of each individual claim to assess personal jurisdiction. 
This attempt to fashion a distinctive strain of jurisdictional doctrine 
 
 40. Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1778 (2017). 
 41. Id. at 1778. 
 42. Id. at 1786 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 43. Id. at 1778 (majority opinion). 
 44. Id. at 1779. 
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for aggregate litigation foundered in the Supreme Court. A state 
infringes on another state’s sovereignty if it exercises its “coercive 
power” through adjudication, the Court insisted, when the state 
has “little legitimate interest in the claims in question.”45 The 
legitimacy of this interest requires a claim-by-claim, not aggregate, 
measure. Thus, the Court held, personal jurisdiction depends on 
the connection between the defendant’s forum contacts and each 
individual plaintiff’s “specific claims.” The defendant’s “forum 
contacts that are unrelated to those claims,” no matter how 
“extensive,” are irrelevant.46 None of Bristol-Myers’s California 
contacts led directly to injuries in Kansas, Texas, or any of the 
nonresident plaintiffs’ states. Accordingly, these contacts could not 
require the company to litigate non-residents’ claims in California.47 
BMS ensures that non-class aggregate litigation involving 
plaintiffs from different states will proceed in one of only two sets 
of fora.48 If the defendant has continuous and systematic contacts 
with the forum state, the state has a legitimate interest in the liti-
gation, regardless of where the plaintiffs’ claims arise. This general 
jurisdiction exists in those states where the defendant is “at home,” 
a category that for corporate defendants likely includes only the 
state hosting its principal place of business and the state of its 
incorporation.49 Otherwise, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict 
Litigation can consolidate multiple suits filed in different states and 
transfer them to any federal court for pre-trial processing.50 
B. The Class Action Exception 
BMS involved the consolidation of hundreds of individually-
filed claims into one proceeding. In a class action, of course, absent 
class members do not individually file claims. The class certification 
decision joins them. Before BMS, in no instance of which we are 
aware did a class action fail because of an inadequate relationship 
 
 45. Id. at 1780. 
 46. Id. at 1781. 
 47. Id. at 1782. 
 48. Andrew D. Bradt & D. Theodore Rave, Aggregation on Defendants’ Terms: Bristol-
Myers Squibb and the Federalization of Mass-Tort Litigation, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1251, 1252 (2018). 
 49. 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1067.5 (4th 
ed. Apr. 2019 update). 
 50. Andrew D. Bradt, The Long Arm of Multidistrict Litigation, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1165, 1205, 1212–13 (2018). 
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between the defendant’s forum contacts and absent class members’ 
claims.51 
But many, beginning with Justice Sotomayor in her BMS 
dissent, quickly appreciated the decision’s potential significance for 
multistate class actions.52 Personal jurisdiction requires a close 
nexus between the defendant’s forum contacts and each plaintiff’s 
claim. If aggregation of any sort does not affect this standard 
prerequisite, then BMS would seem to limit class counsel suing on 
behalf of people from different states to one of two forum choices. 
They could file a single multistate case in the court of a state that 
has general jurisdiction.53 Otherwise, class counsel could file 
several cases in several states, with each class defined to include 
only those injured within each forum state. This strategy would 
require class counsel to retain local counsel and litigate redundant 
lawsuits unless they sought multidistrict litigation (MDL) transfer 
 
 51. See Allen v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., No. 3:13-cv-01279-WHO, 2018 WL 6460451, at *7 
(N.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2018) (“Prior to Bristol-Myers, there would have been no basis for [the 
defendant] to mount a due process challenge against the nonresident absent class 
members . . . .”); Al Haj v. Pfizer Inc., 338 F. Supp. 3d 815, 819 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (describing the 
defendant’s effort to apply Bristol-Myers to class actions as amounting to an “extraordinary 
sea change in class action practice”); 2 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS 
§ 6:26 (5th ed. Nov. 2018 update) (“Nationwide class actions filed against large national 
corporations in states that are not their homes have not raised significant personal 
jurisdiction challenges.”). Two of the country’s leading class action defense firms argued 
after BMS that the decision amounted to a change in law for class actions. Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities in Support of Scotts’ Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for 
Judgment on the Pleadings at 1, In re Morning Song Bird Food Litig., No. 3:12-cv-01592-JAH-
AGS, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44825 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2018) (No. 344-1) (Jones Day); Defendant 
James Hagedorn’s Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration of the Court’s 
September 29, 2016 Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendant Hagedorn’s 
Motion to Dismiss, or, in the Alternative, Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings at 1–2, In re 
Morning Song Bird Food Litig., No. 3:12-cv-01592-JAH-AGS, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44825 
(S.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2018) (No. 345-1) (Kirkland and Ellis). For decisions describing the 
doctrine pre-BMS, see, e.g., In re Western States Wholesale Natural Gas Antitrust Litig., No. 
MDL 1566 2:03–CV–01431–PMP–PAL 2:07–CV–01019–PMP–PAL, 2009 WL 10692801, at *5 
(D. Nev. Mar. 9, 2009) (“The named class representatives’ claims must satisfy the specific 
jurisdiction test.”); Williams v. Firstplus Home Loan Trust 1996-2, 209 F.R.D. 404, 412 (W.D. 
Tenn. 2002) (“[N]amed plaintiffs’ claims must satisfy the requirements for personal 
jurisdiction . . . .”); Barry v. Mortgage Servicing Acquisition Corp., 909 F. Supp. 65, 73 (D.R.I. 
1995) (“It is the named class representative . . . whose claims must satisfy [the specific 
jurisdiction] test in order for the Court to have personal jurisdiction over [the 
defendant] . . . .”). 
 52. Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co., 137 S. Ct. at 1789 n.4 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); see also 
Bradt & Rave, supra note 48, at 1282, 1288. 
 53. Rafferty v. Denny’s, Inc., No. 5:18-cv-2409, 2019 WL 2924998, at *7 (N.D. Ohio July 
8, 2019); 2 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 6:26 (5th ed. Nov. 2018 
update). 
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and consolidation. If class counsel did not pursue an MDL strategy, 
the defendant would, unless litigating multiple smaller cases would 
give the defendant a settlement advantage.54 
Either way, BMS’s application would deprive class counsel of 
control over forum choice. The party controlling the choice of forum 
always has an advantage,55 but this advantage can be particularly 
significant in class actions. The lower federal courts have splintered 
on a number of important aspects of class action doctrine, 
including, for instance, issue certification,56 administrative 
feasibility,57 class member evidence-of-injury requirements,58 and, 
as discussed below, class standing.59 Different approaches to the 
choice-of-law problems created by multi-state class actions alleging 
state law claims have particular significance for the sort of litigation 
that BMS implicates.60 
It perhaps overstates the matter to assert, as one district court 
did, that BMS’s application “would eviscerate the class action 
vehicle as we know it . . . .”61 But litigant behavior clearly indicates 
something significant afoot. Class counsel have fought dozens of 
BMS-prompted motions to dismiss rather than acquiesce in a 
transfer to the defendant’s home jurisdiction, indicating that forum 
choice indeed matters. In a minority of instances, courts have deter-
mined that BMS does apply in class actions.62 The logic follows a 
 
 54. A defendant might, if it believed that it could, conduct a “reverse auction” between 
competing sets of class counsel to settle its liability at the cheapest price. 
 55. See Scott Dodson, Jurisdiction in the Trump Era, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 73, 78 (2018). 
See generally Neel U. Sukhatme, A Theoretical and Empirical Study of Forum Shopping in 
Diversity Cases (Apr. 18, 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1989250. 
 56. Martin v. Behr Dayton Thermal Prods. LLC, 896 F.3d 405, 411–13 (6th Cir. 2018) 
(describing circuit split). 
 57. In re Petrobras Sec., 862 F.3d 250, 267–68 (2d Cir. 2017). 
 58. In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790, 800–01 (5th Cir. 2014). 
 59. See infra Section III.B. 
 60. See 2 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 4:61 (5th ed. Nov. 
2018 update). 
 61. Lyngaas v. Curaden AG, No. 17-cv-10910, 2019 WL 2231217, at *18 (E.D. Mich. 
May 23, 2019). 
 62. E.g., In re Dicamba Herbicides Litig., 359 F. Supp. 3d 711, 722–23 (E.D. Mo. 2019); 
America’s Health & Res. Ctr., Ltd. v. Promologics, Inc., No. 16 C 9281, 2018 WL 3474444, at 
*2 (N.D. Ill. July 19, 2018); Chavez v. Church & Dwight Co., No. 17 C 1948, 2018 WL 2238191, 
at *10 (N.D. Ill. May 16, 2018); Practice Mgmt. Support Servs., Inc. v. Cirque du Soleil, Inc., 
301 F. Supp. 3d 840, 861 (N.D. Ill. 2018); DeBernardis v. NBTY, Inc., No. 17 C 6125, 2018 WL 
461228, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 18, 2018); Greene v. Mizuho Bank, Ltd., 289 F. Supp. 3d 870, 874 
(N.D. Ill. 2017); McDonnell v. Nature’s Way Prods., LLC, No. 16 C 5011, 2017 WL 4864910, at 
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few simple steps. Absent class members’ claims get joined through 
Rule 23’s application. The Rules Enabling Act, Rule 23’s source, 
prohibits rules of procedure that “abridge, enlarge or modify any 
substantive right.”63 The statute thus requires that “a defendant’s 
due process interest . . . be the same in the class context” as it is in 
any other case.64 A defendant has a due process right to demand 
that the relationship between its forum contacts and a plaintiff’s 
claim meet a particular jurisdictional threshold. If a defendant has 
this right in an individual action, the Rules Enabling Act cannot 
allow the right to disappear just because the claimant joins the case 
as an absent class member.65 
The majority of federal courts disagree and have fashioned a 
class action exception to BMS.66 Two of their justifications, one 
rooted in federalism and the other in due process, are unconvincing. 
The third, which rests on a presumption of absent class member 
juridical irrelevance, holds promise. But it needs further elaboration. 
1. Federalism and the class action exception 
BMS has had a negligible impact on state class action litigation,67 
while federal courts have wrestled with the decision. This pattern 
makes sense, at least superficially. BMS only matters when class 
members come from different states. Cases fitting this description 
almost always qualify for federal subject matter jurisdiction.68 If a 
 
*4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 26, 2017); Wenokur v. AXA Equitable Life Ins. Co., No. CV-17-00165-PHX-
DLR, 2017 WL 4357916, at *4 n.4 (D. Ariz. Oct. 2, 2017); In re Dental Supplies Antitrust Litig., 
No. 16 Civ. 696 (BMC)(GRB), 2017 WL 4217115, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2017). 
 63. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2018). 
 64. Practice Mgmt., 301 F. Supp. 3d at 861. 
 65. See Greene, 289 F. Supp. 3d at 874; see also In re Dicamba, 359 F. Supp. 3d. at 723; In 
re Dental Supplies, 2017 WL 4217115, at *9 (“Personal jurisdiction in class actions must 
comport with due process just the same as any other case.”). 
 66. Knotts v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 346 F. Supp. 3d 1311, 1332 (D. Minn. 2018); 
MCLAUGHLIN ON CLASS ACTIONS § 2:44 (15th ed. 2018 ) (“Most courts that have addressed 
the applicability of the ruling to class actions have concluded that Bristol-Myers does not 
apply to class actions.”). 
 67. As of the time of writing, Westlaw did not contain a single opinion from a state 
court addressing BMS’s applicability to class actions. 
 68. If the plaintiffs bring a federal claim, the case satisfies the requirements for federal 
question jurisdiction. If the plaintiffs bring state law claims but allege more than $5 million 
in controversy, then the case typically qualifies for diversity jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332(d) (2018). 
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named plaintiff does not file originally in federal court, the defen-
dant will likely remove. 
At a more fundamental level, the fact that federal courts have 
had to wrestle with BMS highlights a conceptual difficulty with 
modern personal jurisdiction doctrine.69 It developed in part to 
referee interstate relations.70 This “horizontal federalism” moti-
vation has long proven difficult to parse.71 Personal jurisdiction 
doctrine flows from the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause, and thus it involves personal, not structural, concerns.72 
BMS recognizes that this is so, insisting that the doctrine’s “‘primary 
concern’ is ‘the burden on the defendant.’”73 A few sentences later, 
however, BMS identifies state sovereignty as the doctrine’s 
animating force, noting that one state’s excessive exercise of 
jurisdiction infringes on the sovereignty of others.74 “[A]t times,” 
the Court maintains, “this federalism interest may be decisive.”75 
The doctrine’s restatement mostly in terms of substantive due 
process can straighten out this tangle.76 The courts of a state have 
jurisdiction over a defendant when the defendant’s relationship 
with the state gives it a legitimate regulatory interest, subject to a 
check for serious inconvenience to the defendant. This formulation 
recognizes that courts, as institutions of state government, engage 
in a regulatory exercise when they supervise litigation and enter 
judgments.77 As such, litigation in a state court necessarily has 
 
 69. Cf. Allan R. Stein, The Meaning of “Essentially at Home” in Goodyear Dunlop, 63 S.C. 
L. REV. 527, 533 (2012). 
 70. E.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980) 
(describing the Due Process Clause “as an instrument of interstate federalism”); cf. Bradt, 
supra note 50, at 1179–80 (contrasting the “theoretical justifications for limitations on 
jurisdiction” and including a “power theory” based on concerns about state sovereignty). 
 71. For a thorough treatment, see Allan Erbsen, Impersonal Jurisdiction, 60 EMORY L.J. 
1, 61–74 (2010). 
 72. Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982). 
 73. Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780 (2017). 
(quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980)). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. See, e.g., Charles W. Rhodes, Liberty, Substantive Due Process, and Personal 
Jurisdiction, 82 TUL. L. REV. 567, 602–19 (2007); A. Benjamin Spencer, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: 
A Revised Analysis, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 617, 633–34 (2006). 
 77. As Clyde Spillenger argues, modern personal jurisdiction law originated in 
concerns about the legitimate extent of a state’s regulatory authority. Clyde Spillenger, Risk 
Regulation, Extraterritoriality, and Domicile: The Constitutionalization of American Choice of Law, 
1850-1940, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1240, 1326–27 (2015). 
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implications for the state’s relationship with others. The excessive 
exercise of jurisdiction by the courts of one state projects the state’s 
power beyond situations in which it has a legitimate regulatory 
interest, at odds with a system of limits on the respective states’ 
sovereign authority.78 Individuals have a right to a government that 
abides by limits on its power, and thus they can object by raising a 
personal jurisdiction defense.79 
If this description of personal jurisdiction doctrine is correct,80 
one wonders why BMS has anything to do with federal class actions 
at all.81 If a court exercises the sovereign power of the government 
to which it belongs, then the jurisdictionally relevant sovereign for 
the federal courts should be the United States. When a federal court 
adjudicates, it does not occasion an infringement on one state’s 
power by another state’s instrument of government.82 A defendant’s 
contacts with one state or another are therefore irrelevant.83 
Horizontal federalism concerns should be inapposite; as one district 
court insisted, “[a] nationwide class action in federal court is not 
about a state’s overreaching[.]”84 
Some courts have justified a class action exception to BMS with 
this reasoning.85 While we agree that federalism’s irrelevance should 
support the exception on policy grounds,86 a legal argument 
anchored solely in federalism terms proves too much. No principled 
reason exists to sideline standard personal jurisdiction doctrine 
only in class actions, as the argument succeeds (or fails) equally for 
 
 78. Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co., 137 S. Ct. at 1780. 
 79. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 884 (2011). 
 80. Cf. James Weinstein, The Federal Common Law Origins of Judicial Jurisdiction: 
Implications for Modern Doctrine, 90 VA. L. REV. 169, 231–32 (2004) (conceding that “[l]anguage 
in modern Supreme Court decisions . . . suggests that the Court conceives of [personal 
jurisdiction] as a species of substantive due process,” but arguing that the modern test for 
personal jurisdiction “is considerably out of line with the rest of substantive due process 
doctrine”). 
 81. Sanchez v. Launch Tech. Workforce Sols., LLC, 297 F. Supp. 3d 1360, 1367 (N.D. 
Ga. 2018); In re Chinese Mfr. Drywall Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 09-2047, 2017 WL 5971622, at 
*19–20 (E.D. La. Nov. 30, 2017). 
 82. Sloan v. Gen. Motors LLC, 287 F. Supp. 3d 840, 859 (N.D. Cal. 2018). 
 83. See, e.g., id. at 857–58. 
 84. Chinese Mfr. Drywall, 2017 WL 5971622, at *20. 
 85. See Pascal v. Concentra, Inc., No. 19-cv-02559-JCS, 2019 WL 3934936, at *5 (N.D. 
Cal. Aug. 20, 2019); Cabrera v. Bayer Healthcare, LLC, No. LA CV17-08525 JAK (JPRx), 2019 
WL 1146828, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2019); Sanchez, 297 F. Supp. 3d at 1367; Chinese Mfr. 
Drywall, 2017 WL 5971622, at *19–20. 
 86. See infra p. 1548. 
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all federal litigation.87 Congress has enacted more expansive juris-
dictional provisions for some types of federal litigation, and Rule 4 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure exempts certain types of 
claims from standard doctrine.88 Otherwise, since at least 1938, a 
federal court’s jurisdictional reach equals that of a state court of the 
state where the federal court sits.89 A court-fashioned class action 
exception, justified in federalism terms, usurps control over juris-
dictional policy that belongs either to Congress or to the Federal 
Civil Rules Advisory Committee.90 
2. Due process and the class action exception 
A second justification for a class action exception to BMS 
explains that the due process protections Rule 23 extends to defen-
dants obviate any need for personal jurisdiction limits.91 As one 
court argued, “[p]ersonal jurisdiction is rooted in fairness to the 
defendant, and Rule 23 provides significant safeguards to that 
end.”92 
Stated in such conclusory terms, the justification is weak. One 
set of fairness protections cannot substitute for another just because 
both vindicate due process. A proceeding can violate a party’s due 
process rights in various ways. A court may honor due process 
 
 87. E.g., Jonathan Remy Nash, National Personal Jurisdiction, 68 EMORY L.J. 509, 523–30 
(2019). 
 88. Id. at 521–22. 
 89. A. Benjamin Spencer, Nationwide Personal Jurisdiction for Our Federal Courts, 87 
DENV. U. L. REV. 325, 326–27 (2010); cf. Muir v. Nature’s Bounty (DE), Inc., No. 15 C 9835, 
2018 WL 3647115, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 1, 2018) (noting that “Bristol-Myers imposes an indirect 
bar on federal courts’ exercise of . . . personal jurisdiction” through the application of Rule 
4). 
 90. But cf. Patrick Woolley, Rediscovering the Limited Role of the Federal Rules in 
Regulating Personal Jurisdiction, 56 HOUS. L. REV. 565 (2019) (challenging the assumption that 
the Federal Rules can regulate amenability to jurisdiction). 
 91. Ross v. Huron Law Grp. W. Va., PLLC, No. 3:18-0036, 2019 WL 637717, at *3–4 
(S.D.W. Va. Feb. 14, 2019); Hicks v. Hous. Baptist Univ., No. 5:17-CV-629-FL, 2019 WL 96219, 
at *5 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 3, 2019); Casso’s Wellness Store & Gym, LLC v. Spectrum Lab. Prods., 
Inc., No. 17-2161, 2018 WL 1377608, at *5 (E.D. La. Mar. 19, 2018); Molock v. Whole Foods 
Mkt., Inc., 297 F. Supp. 3d 114, 126–27 (D.D.C. 2018). 
 92. Allen v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., No. 3:13-cv-01279-WHO, 2018 WL 6460451, at *7 
(N.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2018); see also In re Takata Airbag Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2599, 2019 WL 
2570616, at *18 (S.D. Fla. June 21, 2019); Cabrera v. Bayer Healthcare, LLC, No. LA CV17-
08525 JAK (JPRx), 2019 WL 1146828, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2019); Molock, 297 F. Supp. 3d at 
126; In re Chinese Mfr. Drywall Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 09-2047, 2017 WL 5971622, at *14 (E.D. 
La. Nov. 30, 2017). 
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limitations on non-party preclusion, for example.93 But it can 
nonetheless violate the defendant’s due process rights by excusing 
the plaintiff from notifying the defendant before entering judgment.94 
Due process provides for fundamental fairness in different, non-
fungible ways at different stages in a case’s life cycle. 
A more convincing effort to justify a class action exception in 
due process terms stresses what “the requirements of Rule 23 class 
certification ensure[,]” that “the defendant is presented with a 
unitary, coherent claim to which it need respond only with a unitary, 
coherent defense.”95 To expand on this logic: if the named plaintiff’s 
claim arises out of the defendant’s purposeful availment of the 
forum, this individual claim meets specific jurisdiction require-
ments, BMS or no. Rule 23 requires that the adjudication of all class 
members’ claims involve basically the same evidence and legal 
arguments. Thus, the burden on the defendant to defend a class suit 
on the merits, so the logic goes, differs in no appreciable way from 
the burden that an individual defense of the named plaintiff’s claim 
entails. “[T]he unitary nature of [a] class claim” justifies “haling the 
defendant into court to answer” all of the class members’ claims “in 
a forum that has specific jurisdiction . . . based on the representative’s 
claim” alone.96 
This argument has roots in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, the 
only time the Court has addressed the intersection between Rule 23 
and personal jurisdiction.97 Shutts determined that a court can enter 
a judgment resolving absent class members’ claims even if the class 
members lack jurisdictionally adequate contacts with the forum 
state, so long as the court provides “safeguards” to ensure the 
adequate representation of class member interests.98 Protected 
thusly, absent class members can “sit back and allow the litigation 
to run its course[.]” They can justifiably assume that the named 
 
 93. The Due Process Clause requires strict limits on non-party preclusion. See Taylor 
v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 (2008). 
 94. Cf. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (holding that 
due process requires notice “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise 
interested parties of the” lawsuit). 
 95. Sanchez v. Launch Tech. Workforce Sols., LLC, 297 F. Supp. 3d 1360, 1366 (N.D. 
Ga. 2018). 
 96. Id. at 1366. 
 97. 472 U.S. 797 (1985). 
 98. Id. at 810; see also Richard A. Nagareda, Administering Adequacy in Class 
Representation, 82 TEX. L. REV. 287, 310 (2003). 
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plaintiffs’ effort to win her own claim will also benefit their claims.99 
The “fewer burdens” than what litigation imposes on a defendant 
mean that absent class members can do without the protections that 
personal jurisdiction limitations offer.100 
Shutts rests on two intertwined supports. First, class certification 
requirements and Rule 23’s protections for absent class members 
ensure the adequate representation of their interests, obviating the 
need for class member participation.101 Second, this representation 
happens without the imposition of any meaningful burden on 
absent class members. One of these supports falls away when the 
party seeking protection is the defendant, not an absent class 
member.102 Rule 23 and the “unitary, coherent”103 case it requires 
may indeed ensure that a merits defense against the named 
plaintiff’s claim suffices as a merits defense against all class 
members’ claims. But the notion that a class action imposes no 
meaningful burden on a defendant beyond what an individual 
claim occasions is absurd. The additional burden is indisputable,104 
even if one makes the formalistic assumption that a defendant’s 
investment in litigating the merits does not differ from an individual 
case to a class action.105 We agree that the “unitary, coherent” case 
Rule 23 requires should favor a class action exception.106 Class 
certification means that, in real-world terms, the difference to the 
defendant between litigating a single-state class action (which BMS 
 
 99. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 810, 812. 
 100. Id. at 811. 
 101. Nagareda, supra note 98, at 310 (“[T]he due process checklist in Shutts tracks the 
familiar taxonomy of exit, voice, and loyalty rights[.]”); John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action 
Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. 
REV. 370, 375–76 (2000) (conceiving of rights to notice, to opt out, and to a finding of adequate 
representation in terms of rights of exit, voice, and loyalty, and suggesting that these rights 
undergird a “theory of representational adequacy”). 
 102. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 810. 
 103. Sanchez v. Launch Tech. Workforce Sols., LLC, 297 F. Supp. 3d 1360, 1366 (N.D. 
Ga. 2018). 
 104. Class actions necessarily increase costs above and beyond individual litigation. 
The class certification motion, for instance, involves time-consuming, expensive litigation. A 
loss on the merits authorizes the court to shift the cost of notice to the defendants. Hunt v. 
Imperial Merchant Servs., Inc., 560 F.3d 1137, 1143 (9th Cir. 2009); 3 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, 
NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 8:33 (5th ed., 2018). 
 105. Cf. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 408–09 
(2010) (insisting that the class certification’s effect—a transformation of a dispute from one 
with $500 at stake to one with $5 million at stake— “has no bearing . . . on legal rights”). 
 106. See infra pp. 1547–49. 
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would not implicate) and a multi-state class action is not so 
significant as to require a wholesale change in decades of personal 
jurisdiction practice.107 But the claim that Rule 23 and personal 
jurisdiction doctrine are fungible in terms of due process is 
implausible. 
3. Juridical irrelevance, the regulatory model, and the class action 
exception 
The third justification for a class action exception simply posits 
that absent class members “are not parties for the purpose of 
constitutional and statutory doctrines governing whether a court 
has the power to adjudicate their claims.”108 This argument has 
solid if superficial support. As the Supreme Court has recognized, 
“[n]onnamed class members . . . may be parties for some purposes 
and not for others.”109 Defendants can rarely allege counterclaims 
against absent class members, for instance,110 and absent class 
members have no input when the parties consent to a magistrate 
judge.111 But the justification also veers toward the ipse dixit unless 
it can answer the basic question: why shouldn’t an absent class 
member count as a party for personal jurisdiction purposes?112 
 
 107. See infra pp. 1547–49. 
 108. Al Haj v. Pfizer Inc., 338 F. Supp. 3d 815, 820 (N.D. Ill. 2018); see also Sanchez v. 
Launch Tech. Workforce Sols., LLC, 297 F. Supp. 3d 1360, 1365 (N.D. Ga. 2018); Molock v. 
Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 297 F. Supp. 3d 114, 126 (D.D.C. 2018); Knotts v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 
346 F. Supp. 3d 1310, 1333 (D. Minn. 2018); Fitzhenry-Russell v. Dr. Pepper Snapple Grp., 
Inc., Case No. 17-cv-00564 NC, 2017 WL 4224723, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2017); In re Chinese 
Mfr. Drywall Prods. Liab. Litig., Civil Action MDL No. 09-2047, 2017 WL 5971622, at *12 
(E.D. La. Nov. 30, 2017); Morgan v. U.S. Xpress, Inc., Case No. 3:17-cv-00085, 2018 WL 
3580775, at *5 (W.D. Va. July 25, 2018). 
 109. Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 9 (2002); see also Sanchez, 297 F. Supp. 3d at 1368–
69; Coleman v. Labor and Indus. Review Comm’n of Wis., 860 F.3d 461, 471 (7th Cir. 2017). 
For a reinterpretation of this statement and criticism of the claim that class members can be 
parties for some purposes and not others, see A. Benjamin Spencer, Out of the Quandary: 
Personal Jurisdiction Over Absent Class Members Explained, 39 REV. LITIG. (forthcoming 2019) 
(Draft at 4-7) (https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3461113). 
 110. Owner-Operator Indep. Driver Ass’n v. Arctic Express, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d 963, 
967–68 (S.D. Ohio 2003). 
 111. Koby v. ARS Nat’l Servs., Inc., 846 F.3d 1071, 1076 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 112. One district court explained that “absent class members are not parties for 
purposes of diversity of citizenship, amount in controversy, and Article III standing . . . .” 
Personal jurisdiction, like subject matter jurisdiction, “set[s] forth the conditions under which 
a particular sovereign’s courts may hear a case” and thus “[i]t follows that there is no good 
reason why absent class members should be treated as non-parties for purposes of 
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This is where the regulatory conception can help. It lends 
normative support to the notion that absent class members should 
not count as discrete, individual parties and are therefore juridically 
irrelevant.113 The regulatory conception treats the class action as a 
device to enable law enforcement. A group of undifferentiated 
regulatory beneficiaries, absent class members serve as indistinct 
vessels through whom litigation can vindicate substantive liability 
policy. Details of each one’s claim, such as where exactly it arose, 
do not matter. The case emphasizes the defendant’s conduct and 
the proper regulatory response. If the named plaintiff’s claim arises 
out of the defendant’s forum contacts, the court has enough 
legitimate regulatory authority to adjudicate for the class.114 
We suspect that something like an appreciation for litigation’s 
regulatory role lurks somewhere in the motivation for the class 
action exception to BMS. Most of the cases that have presented the 
issue involve small-scale consumer protection claims. Affected 
consumers often have no idea that they are injured or do not care if 
they are. With no meaningful breach of the social peace to repair, 
the litigation of these claims makes little sense in conflict resolution 
terms. The only real argument for many negative value class 
 
establishing subject matter jurisdiction, but as parties for purposes of establishing personal 
jurisdiction . . . .” Al Haj v. Pfizer Inc., 338 F. Supp. 3d 815, 820–21 (N.D. Ill. 2018). The district 
court reasoned that “[a]bsent class members are not parties for purposes of determining 
whether there is complete diversity of citizenship in cases governed by state substantive 
law[,]” citing the Supreme Court’s 2002 Devlin decision. It continued: “Nor are they parties 
for purposes of calculating the amount in controversy in diversity suits not brought under 
the Class Action Fairness Act . . . .” Al Haj, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 820. This argument relies in 
significant measure on an outdated and now-erroneous understanding of absent class 
members as irrelevant for the purposes of assessing diversity of citizenship and determining 
the amount-in-controversy. The Class Action Fairness Act, passed in 2005, provides that the 
diversity of citizenship requirement is satisfied when “any member of a class of plaintiffs is 
a citizen of a State different from any defendant . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A). It also pegs 
the amount-in-controversy requirement to the total amount the case implicates, a sum that 
necessarily includes the value of the absent class member’s claims. 1332(d)(2). The category 
of “diversity suits not brought under the Class Action Fairness Act” to which the district 
court refers seems only to include defendant class actions, a set different from ones 
addressed by Bristol-Myers. Al Haj, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 820 (citing Travelers Property Casualty 
v. Good, 689 F.3d 714 (7th Cir. 2012)). 
 113. Cf. Wood, supra note 39, at 616 & n.50 (explaining personal jurisdiction’s exclusive 
focus on the named plaintiff with reference to the “representational” model of the class 
action, and claiming that Abram Chayes’ version of the regulatory model of litigation favors 
the “representational” model of the class action). 
 114. For a summary of a related argument, see Scott Dodson, Personal Jurisdiction and 
Aggregation, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 30–31 (2018). 
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actions is regulatory.115 As of the time of writing, personal 
jurisdiction doctrine post–BMS offers district courts the rare doctrinal 
lever they can pull however they want, because no circuit has yet 
addressed the issue.116 A skeptical district judge could freely apply 
BMS and raise a jurisdictional hurdle to the prosecution of negative 
value cases. The fact that a majority of courts have done otherwise 
suggests some deep underlying acceptance of or even enthusiasm 
for litigation in a regulatory vein. 
As we argue in Part IV, this majority has rightly exempted class 
actions from BMS’s reach. But for those anxious to preserve the 
class action’s power, a preexisting commitment to the regulatory 
conception runs into trouble as a motivation for doctrinal design. A 
powerful class action benefits from the conflict resolution concep-
tion when the focus shifts from personal to subject matter 
jurisdiction. 
III. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION  
AND THE INJURY DIFFERENCE PROBLEM 
The federal courts have long struggled to navigate the tricky 
intersection between class actions and Article III standing 
doctrine.117 The “injury difference problem” often arises: when do 
differences between the named plaintiff and absent class members 
deprive the former of standing to sue on behalf of the latter? The 
problem’s persistence results in part from the Supreme Court’s 
conflicting guidance on the administration of standing doctrine  
in class actions. Imprecision in how the lower federal courts 
categorize the problem’s variations might also bear some respon-
sibility. But the injury difference problem largely disappears if 
absent class members are juridically relevant, a status the conflict 
resolution conception supports. Their juridical irrelevance, by 
 
 115. E.g., David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 913, 924 (1998) (“[T]he small claim class action strikes me as one that serves the 
purpose not of compensating those harmed in any significant sense . . . but rather. . . the 
purpose of allowing a private attorney general to contribute to social welfare by bringing an 
action whose effect is to internalize to the wrongdoer the cost of the wrong.”). 
 116. E.g., Gress v. Freedom Mortg. Corp., 386 F. Supp. 3d 455, 461 (M.D. Pa. 2019) 
(commenting on the dearth of circuit guidance). 
 117. E.g., Jean Wegman Burns, Standing and Mootness in Class Actions: A Search for 
Consistency, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1239, 1262 (1989). 
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contrast, triggers tricky justiciability questions that existing 
doctrine poorly answers. 
A. The Supreme Court’s Muddled Guidance 
By the mid–1970s, the Supreme Court had developed a basic 
principle of standing in class actions: a named plaintiff must have 
some injury of her own and cannot invoke class members’ injuries 
to support her own claim for standing.118 The Court’s subsequent 
efforts to build on this foundation have zigged and zagged in 
confusing ways.119 Blum v. Yaretsky, the Court’s initial engagement 
with the injury difference problem, involved the adequacy of 
procedures that New York State used to determine whether to 
transfer Medicaid recipients living in nursing homes from one level 
of care to another.120 The named plaintiffs, whom the state had 
transferred from a higher level of care to a lower one, had standing 
to sue on behalf of a class of similarly treated recipients.121 But they 
lacked standing to challenge the adequacy of procedures for transfers 
from a lower to a higher level of care. “[T]he conditions under which 
such transfers occur are sufficiently different from those which 
respondents do have standing to challenge[,]” the Court explained, 
“that any judicial assessment of their procedural adequacy would 
be wholly gratuitous and advisory.”122 
Lewis v. Casey follows neatly from Blum.123 The named plaintiffs, 
inmates in Arizona prisons, challenged a range of policies and 
practices in use at all facilities in the state that limited court access 
 
 118. Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 40 n.20 (1976) (“That a suit may 
be a class action, however, adds nothing to the question of standing, for even named 
plaintiffs who represent a class ‘must allege and show that they personally have been injured, 
not that injury has been suffered by other, unidentified members of the class to which they 
belong and which they purport to represent.’” (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 502 
(1975))); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975); O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974); 
Note, Class Standing and the Class Representative, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1637, 1637 (1981). 
 119. NECA-IBEW Health & Welfare Fund v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 693 F.3d 145, 160 
(2d Cir. 2012) (commenting on “tension” in the Court’s guidance); Plumbers Union Local No. 
12 Pension Fund v. Nomura Asset Acceptance Corp., 632 F.3d 762, 769 (1st Cir. 2011) (noting 
that “the Supreme Court has not been consistent”). 
 120. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 994–96 (1982). 
 121. Id. at 1000. 
 122. Id. at 1001. 
 123. Whether Lewis v. Casey is really a decision about standing or a decision about the 
scope of an injunctive remedy is up for debate. E.g., 13B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., 
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §§ 3531.2, 3531.6 (4th ed. 2019). 
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for prisoners.124 At trial, only one named plaintiff proved an actual 
injury, and that injury involved only one specific barrier to court 
access at one prison.125 The system-wide injunction the district court 
issued to correct the range of problems at all facilities could not 
stand. As the Court reasoned, “[t]he actual-injury requirement” for 
Article III standing “would hardly serve [its] purpose . . . if once a 
plaintiff demonstrated harm from one particular inadequacy in 
government administration, the court were authorized to remedy 
all inadequacies in that administration.”126 
Lewis v. Casey and Blum seem to hinge the named plaintiff’s 
standing to litigate a class action and the court’s power to issue a 
class-wide remedy on some threshold of similarity between the 
injury she suffers and the injuries she alleges for the class as a 
whole. In Gratz v. Bollinger, the Court backed away from this 
jurisdictional prerequisite. One of the named plaintiffs, who had 
unsuccessfully applied for admission as a freshman to the 
University of Michigan, challenged the university’s affirmative 
action policies for both freshman and transfer admissions.127 Citing 
Blum and Lewis, Justice Stevens insisted in dissent that differences 
between the freshman and transfer admission policies denied the 
named plaintiff standing to challenge the latter.128 Chief Justice 
Rehnquist responded for the majority, asking “whether the 
relevance of this variation . . . is a matter of Article III standing at 
all or whether it goes to the propriety of class certification pursuant 
to Rule 23.”129 Without answering directly, he hinted that Rule 23, 
not a standalone jurisdictional prerequisite, best addresses the 
necessary nexus between the named plaintiffs’ injuries and the 
class’s. Quoting from the “[p]articularly instructive” General 
Telephone Co. of Southwest v. Falcon,130 a case about class certification, 
the Chief Justice reasoned that the named plaintiff could represent 
 
 124. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 346–47 (1996). 
 125. Id. at 358. 
 126. Id. at 357 (emphasis omitted). 
 127. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 251 (2003). 
 128. Id. at 286–87 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 129. Id. at 263 (majority opinion). The majority noted “tension in our prior cases in this 
regard.” Id. at 263 n.15. 
 130. Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147 (1982); see also 1 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, 
NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 2:6 (5th ed. 2018) (discussing Falcon). 
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both freshman and transfer applicants because their claims all 
“implicate[]” the “same set of concerns.”131 
B. The Injury Difference Conundrum 
1. Three injury difference scenarios 
Not surprisingly, given the tension in Supreme Court treatments 
of class standing, lower courts have struggled to craft a consensus 
approach to the injury difference problem. A classification of the 
three ways in which the problem typically arises can help shed 
some light. The first is the “different defendant, same law, same 
conduct” scenario. The named plaintiff sues several defendants on 
behalf of the class. She alleges that all defendants engaged in the 
same general course of conduct, and that the same body of substan-
tive law gives all class members their claims. But only one of the 
defendants actually injured the named plaintiff; different defendants 
injured different class members. 
A few courts have held that named plaintiffs have standing to 
sue on behalf of the class under these circumstances so long as a 
“juridical link” joins all of the defendants’ conduct together.132 Such 
a juridical link exists, the Seventh Circuit held, if the defendants 
engaged in “a conspiracy or concerted scheme,” or if their conduct 
is “otherwise ‘juridically related in a manner that suggests a single 
resolution of the dispute would be expeditious’ . . . .”133 A court has 
jurisdiction under this scenario because after class certification “the 
class as a whole[,]” not individual members or the named plaintiff, 
“is the focal point” for the purposes of assessing standing.134 
The second version of the injury difference problem involves 
the “same defendant, different laws, same conduct” scenario. It 
arises in multistate class actions alleging state law claims. The 
named plaintiff sues a defendant for an undifferentiated course of 
conduct it directed at all class members. They happen to live in 
different states, and the relevant substantive liability doctrine is 
 
 131. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 267. 
 132. Payton v. County of Kane, 308 F.3d 673, 678–80 (7th Cir. 2002); see also Stewart v. 
Bureau Inv. Group No. 1, LLC, 24 F. Supp. 3d 1142, 1154–56 (M.D. Ala. 2014). 
 133. Payton, 308 F.3d at 679 (quoting La Mar v. H&B Novelty & Loan Co., 489 F.2d 461, 
466 (9th Cir. 1973)). 
 134. Id. at 681. 
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state law. Choice of law rules suggest that the law of each class 
member’s home state will govern each one’s claim. 
Differences in the state laws that apply in multistate cases pose 
hurdles to class certification,135 albeit not necessarily irreducible 
ones.136 But some courts never get to class certification, reasoning 
that a named plaintiff lacks standing to sue on behalf of class 
members from different states.137 This limitation, it seems, involves 
a corollary to the basic principle that “the plaintiff generally must 
assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim 
to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.”138 A 
Connecticut resident injured in Connecticut has standing to bring a 
Connecticut law claim against the defendant, but he has no 
standing to bring claims under Massachusetts law.139 Standing 
doctrine requires that the applicable law give the plaintiff a right to 
recover,140 and Massachusetts law gives the Connecticut resident 
no claim.141 
The “same defendant, same laws, different conduct” scenario 
creates the third version of the injury difference problem. The 
named plaintiff and the absent class members share a defendant in 
common, and they allege claims under a single body of law. But the 
conduct giving rise to their alleged injuries differs from one class 
member to another.142 Securities fraud litigation often involves this 
type of difference. The named plaintiff owns one type of security, 
 
 135. E.g., Mazza v. American Honda Motor Co., 666 F.3d 581, 590 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 136. E.g., Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc., 667 F.3d 273, 301 (3d Cir. 2011); In re McCormick & 
Co., 217 F. Supp. 3d 124, 141–42 (D.D.C. 2016); 2 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS 
ACTIONS § 4:61 (5th ed. Nov. 2018 update). 
 137. E.g., Brenner v. Vizio, Inc., Case No. C17-5897 BHS, 2018 WL 2229274, at *2–*3 
(W.D. Wash. May 16, 2018); Edwards v. North American Power & Gas, LLC, 120 F. Supp. 3d 
132, 138–39 (D. Conn. 2015); In re G-Fees Antitrust Litig., 584 F. Supp. 2d 26, 35–36 (D.D.C. 
2008). 
 138. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975). 
 139. Richards v. Direct Energy Servs., LLC, 120 F. Supp. 3d 148, 155 (D. Conn. 2015). 
 140. Cf. Warth, 422 U.S. at 500 (“[T]he standing question . . . is whether the constitu-
tional or statutory provision on which the claim rests properly can be understood as granting 
persons in the plaintiff’s position a right to judicial relief.”). 
 141. Corcoran v. CVS Health Corp., 169 F. Supp. 3d 970, 990 (N.D. Cal. 2016). 
 142. E.g., Fallick v. Nationwide Mut. Ins., 162 F.3d 410, 423 (6th Cir. 1998). 
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for instance, but tries to sue on behalf of class members who own 
related but different securities.143 
2. Injury difference, standing, and rule 23 
The lower federal courts have responded in different ways to 
the three scenarios. The Seventh Circuit’s approach to the “different 
defendant, same law, same conduct” version represents a minority 
view. The application of the juridical link doctrine enables a named 
plaintiff to sue a defendant who did not injure her. To most courts, 
this license conflicts with the basic standing principle that the 
Supreme Court has unambiguously articulated for class actions.144 
A plaintiff must have standing to assert a claim against a defendant, 
class action or no, and “Rule 23 . . . cannot affect the plaintiff’s 
Article III standing to sue the non-injurious defendants.”145 
The other two scenarios have generated more entrenched 
division in the federal courts as they have struggled to respond.146 
Some have used a “standing approach” to address injury difference. 
Attempting fidelity to cases like Lewis v. Casey and Blum, these 
courts insist that “standing . . . [is a] jurisdictional requirement[] 
that must be satisfied prior to class certification.”147 Thus, some 
standalone jurisdictional inquiry must precede a Rule 23 analysis. 
 
 143. E.g.,  NECA-IBEW Health & Welfare Fund v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 693 F.3d 145, 
158–65 (2d Cir. 2012); In re Bear Stearns Mortg. Pass-Through Certificates Litig., 851 F. Supp. 
2d 746, 778 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Fort Worth Emps.’ Ret. Fund v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., 862 F. 
Supp. 2d 322, 330–41 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); F.D.I.C. v. Countrywide Financial Corp., No. 2:12-CV-
4354 MRP (MANx), 2012 WL 5900973, at *9–*10 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2012); In re Salomon Smith 
Barney Mut. Fund Fees Litig., 441 F. Supp. 2d 579, 604–07 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). Other common 
scenarios involve consumer protection cases, where the class members purchased different 
products. E.g., Anderson v. Jamba Juice Co., 888 F. Supp. 2d 1000, 1005 (N.D. Cal. 2012); 
Brazil v. Dell Inc., No. C-07-01700 RMW, 2008 WL 4912050, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2008). 
Still others involve impact litigation. E.g., Melendres v. Arpaio, 784 F.3d 1254, 1261 (9th Cir. 
2014); Stevens v. Harper, 213 F.R.D. 358, 367–68 (E.D. Cal. 2002). 
 144. E.g., Wong v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A., 789 F.3d 889, 896 (8th Cir. 2015); Akaosugi 
v. Benihana Nat’l Corp., No. C 11-01272 WHA, 2011 WL 5444265 at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 
2011); Buetow v. A.L.S. Enters., 564 F. Supp. 2d 1038, 1045–46 (D. Minn. 2008); In re FEMA 
Trailer Formaldehyde Prods. Liab. Litig., 570 F. Supp. 2d 851, 853–56 (E.D. La. 2008); Popoola 
v. Md-Individual Practice Ass’n, 230 F.R.D. 424, 431–33 (D. Md. 2005); In re Franklin Mut. 
Funds Fee Litig., 388 F. Supp. 2d 451, 462 n.7 (D.N.J. 2005); In re Eaton Vance Corp. Sec. Litig., 
220 F.R.D. 162, 170 (D. Mass. 2004). 
 145. Mahon v. Ticor Title Ins., 683 F.3d 59, 64 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 146. See Melendres, 784 F.3d at 1261–62. 
 147. Stevens, 213 F.R.D. at 366; see also Prado ex rel. Prado-Steinman v. Bush, 221 F.3d 
1266, 1280 (11th Cir. 2000); Fort Worth, 862 F. Supp. 2d at 335; F.D.I.C., 2012 WL at *10; In re 
Salomon Smith Barney, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 606. 
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This inquiry has come in different guises. The Second Circuit 
fashioned one in a “same defendant, same law, different conduct” 
case. The named plaintiff’s standing requires that her claim 
“implicate[] ‘the same set of concerns’ as the conduct alleged to 
have caused injury to other members of the putative class . . . .”148 
Another court crafted a functionally-oriented test. Standing depends 
on whether the named plaintiff’s and class members’ claims 
resulted from the “same underlying conduct,” such that the named 
plaintiff has sufficient interest in redressing the defendants’ conduct 
as other class members experienced it.149 Yet another inquiry asks 
whether the “named plaintiff . . . suffered the same species of injury 
as the members of the class, traceable to the same unlawful conduct 
by a defendant.”150 One court framed the test particularly vaguely: 
“some differences” between class members’ claims do not defeat 
the named plaintiff’s standing, but differences that exceed this 
threshold do.151 
To other courts, the notion that the injury difference problem 
poses a jurisdictional challenge “conflates standing and class 
certification.”152 They eschew any standing analysis at all and use a 
“class certification” approach to deal with differences between the 
named plaintiff and absent class members. Rule 23, not Article III, 
determines when the case can proceed as a class action. If the 
named plaintiff individually meets standing requirements, the 
standing analysis ends. 
 
 148. NECA-IBEW, 693 F.3d at 162. 
 149. Fort Worth, 862 F. Supp. 2d at 333, 335. 
 150. In re Bear Stearns, 851 F. Supp. at 778. 
 151. Arevalo v. Bank of America Corp., 850 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1018 (N.D. Cal. 2011); see 
also Miller v. Ghiradelli Chocolate Co., 912 F. Supp. 2d 861, 869 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (holding that 
standing is sufficient if the named plaintiff and the class members’ claims are “substantially 
similar”). 
 152. Melendres v. Arpaio, 784 F.3d 1254, 1261 (9th Cir. 2014); E.g., Langan v. Johnson 
& Johnson Consumer Cos., 897 F.3d 88, 95 (2d Cir. 2018); Morrison v. YTB Int’l, Inc., 649 F.3d 
533, 536 (7th Cir. 2011); Fallick v. Nationwide Mut. Ins., 162 F.3d 410, 423 (6th Cir. 1998); 
Molock v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 297 F. Supp. 3d 114, 130 (D.D.C. 2018); Dragoslavic v. Ace 
Hardware Corp., 274 F. Supp. 3d 578, 585-86 (E.D. Tex. 2017); Milbourne v. JRK Residential 
America, LLC, Civil Case No. 3:12cv861, 2016 WL 1071564, at *6 (E.D. Va. Mar. 15, 2016); In 
re McCormick & Co., Inc., 217 F. Supp. 3d 124, 144 (D.D.C. 2016); Garner v. VIST Bank, Civil 
Action No. 12-5258, 2013 WL 6731903, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 20, 2013); In re Bayer Corp. 
Combination Aspirin Prods. Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 701 F. Supp. 2d 356, 376–77 
(E.D.N.Y. 2010); In re Relafen Antitrust Litig., 221 F.R.D. 260, 267–69 (D. Mass. 2004). 
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C. Injury Difference and Conflict Resolution 
Confusion about the injury difference problem runs deep.153 On 
one hand, repeated statements disclaiming one plaintiff’s standing 
to litigate another plaintiff’s claim pepper Supreme Court standing 
jurisprudence.154 The insistence that some independent class 
standing analysis precede the class certification determination 
ensures that a court does not decide a class certification motion 
before confirming its jurisdiction to do so.155 On the other hand, a 
vague “same set of concerns” threshold comes with none of the 
specificity or doctrinal elaboration that Rule 23’s commonality, 
typicality, and adequacy of representation requirements bring to 
the issue of a case’s breadth. 
Moreover, courts that have fashioned a version of the standing 
approach do not explain why justiciability problems in class actions 
disappear if the named plaintiff and the absent class members 
suffer the “same species of injury.” To restate the basic principle 
once again, “a party ‘generally must assert his own legal rights and 
interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or 
interests of third parties.’”156 Exceptions to this general rule exist,157 
but none outside the class action premises third party standing 
solely on some vague test that measures the factual resemblance 
among claims.158 An insistence on some standalone standing inquiry 
calls for more doctrinal elaboration than what currently exists to 
justify the named plaintiff’s authority to vindicate the rights of others. 
All of these concerns disappear if absent class members are 
juridically relevant. This status makes standing in class actions no 
 
 153. In a “same defendant, same law, different conduct” case, for instance, the Second 
Circuit adopted a standalone standing test. NECA-IBEW, 693 F.3d at 162. In a “same 
defendant, different laws, same conduct” case, by contrast, the Second Circuit denied that 
the scenario involved a standing issue. Langan, 897 F.3d at 95. 
 154. E.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 499 (1975); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 
163, 166 (1972). 
 155. Neale v. Volvo Cars of N. America, LLC, 794 F.3d 353, 358–59 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 156. Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 129 (2004). 
 157. E.g., 13A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 
3531.9 (3d ed. Apr. 2019 update). 
 158. Third party standing doctrine typically requires something more than just the 
possession of similar claims, and usually a pre-existing “beneficial relationship” between the 
plaintiff and the third party. U.S. Dep’t of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715, 720–21 (1990); 
Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 117 (1976); 13A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL 
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3531.9.3 (3d ed. Nov. 2018 update). 
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more difficult than standing in run-of-the-mill multiparty cases. For 
ordinary litigation, party joinder and standing have no inherent 
relationship. Consider how standing works in a case with two 
plaintiffs. Employee A sues Employer, alleging that Employer 
discriminated against her on the basis of disability. After filing, 
Employee A moves to amend the complaint, to add Employee B as 
a plaintiff alleging a race discrimination claim against Employer. 
The joinder issue does not somehow turn upon Employee A’s 
standing to bring Employee B’s claim. Whether the two employees 
can sue together depends solely on whether their claims meet the 
requirements of Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.159 
If Employee B’s claim arises out of the same transaction or 
occurrence as Employee A’s, and if the two claims share a common 
question of law or fact, then the case can proceed with Employee B 
joined.160 Employee B would have to allege the requisite injury-in-
fact to establish standing, but this obligation has nothing to do with 
Employee A’s own standing.161 
Justice Scalia once described Rule 23 as merely a “species” of 
“traditional joinder.”162 This understanding of class actions implies 
a “bedrock rule,” that “the sole purpose of classwide adjudication 
is to aggregate claims that are individually viable.”163 Justice 
Sotomayor recently echoed these sentiments: “A class action is 
simply ‘a procedural device’ that allows multiple plaintiffs to 
aggregate their claims . . . .”164 If these characterizations are right, 
then courts that use a standing approach for the injury difference 
 
 159. Of course, both parties’ claims must meet requirements specified in one of the 
various statutes governing the federal courts’ subject matter jurisdiction. 
 160. E.g., Ivery v. Gen. Die Casters, Inc., Case No. 5:17-cv-37, 2017 WL 6270239, at *3–
*4 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 8, 2017); Mann v. Con-Way Freight, Inc., Case No. 16-2196-CM, 2016 WL 
6476548, at *2–*3 (D. Kan. Nov. 2, 2016); Rossi v. Fulton Cty. Bd. of Assessors, Civil Action 
File No. 1:10-CV-4254-RWS-AJB, 2011 WL 13254693, at *3–*6 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 21, 2011); Elliott 
v. USF Holland, Inc., Cause No. NA 01-159-C-H/H, 2002 WL 826405, at *1–*2 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 
21, 2002); Byers v. Illinois State Police, No. 99 C 8105, 2000 WL 1808558, at *2–*5 (N.D. Ill. 
Dec. 6, 2000). 
 161. Cf. Lewis v. Nevada, No. 3:13-CV-00312-MMD-WGC, 2014 WL 65799, at *3 n.9 (D. 
Nev. Jan. 7, 2014); Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal., Inc. v. Patriot Coal Corp., No. 3:11-0115, 2011 WL 
6101921, at *10 (S.D.W. Va. Dec. 7, 2011) (warning against “conflat[ing]” the standard for 
joinder under Rule 20 with Article III standing doctrine). 
 162. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 408 (2010). 
 163. Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 552 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 164. Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1427 (2019) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) 
(quoting WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS, § 1.1 (5th ed. 2011)). 
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problem err.165 Each class member is a separate plaintiff, such as 
Employee A or B. If the Rule 23 joinder requirements are satisfied, 
then the absent class members can join, just as Employees A and B 
can join if their claims meet Rule 20’s requirements.166 The matter 
simply does not involve the named plaintiff’s supposed attempt to 
vindicate the rights of others. 
Answers to the three injury difference scenarios come easily. A 
plaintiff must have standing to sue “at the outset of the litigation.”167 
If a named plaintiff sues a defendant who has not injured her, she 
lacks standing, even if she later plans to seek joinder of those whom 
the defendant did injure. The “juridical link” doctrine cannot paper 
over this constitutional flaw. After all, if Employee A worked for 
Employer A and Employee B for Employer B, Employee A cannot 
sue Employer B even if Employers A and B engaged in similar 
conduct. The putative class action can only proceed with the 
problematic defendant joined if the complaint includes a named 
plaintiff who alleges claims against this defendant. 
By contrast, the “class certification” approach best resolves the 
“same defendant, different laws, same conduct” and “same 
defendant, same law, different conduct” scenarios. Before class 
certification, the named plaintiff’s own injury gives her standing to 
sue the defendant. After class certification, each class member’s 
injury gives the class as a whole standing to sue the defendant, 
under all of the laws the case implicates, and for all of the conduct 
challenged. No jurisdictional gap exists that requires dismissal. 
Solutions to the injury difference problem that do not assume 
the juridical relevance of absent class members are possible. But 
they either fit extant standing doctrine poorly, or they require a 
good deal more elaboration. A named plaintiff should not have 
standing to sue on behalf of juridically irrelevant absent class 
members, regardless of the similarity between her and the class 
members’ injuries, unless one of two claims is true. Either the 
named plaintiff enjoys some sort of third party standing, or upon 
 
 165. See, e.g., Edwards v. 21st Century Ins. Co., No. 09-4364, 2010 WL 2652247, at *4 
(D.N.J. June 23, 2010). 
 166. E.g., In re Principal U.S. Prop. Account ERISA Litig., 274 F.R.D. 649, 656–57 (S.D. 
Iowa 2011) (discussing Shady Grove and following this logic). 
 167. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180 
(2000). 
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class certification the class as an entity becomes the relevant party 
for standing purposes. As noted, third party standing does exist 
under limited circumstances, as an exception to the general rule 
that one person lacks standing to assert claims of another.168 But, 
despite the odd and poorly supported claim to the contrary,169 this 
doctrine shares—at best—a “confused conceptual nexus” with 
“class-action theory.”170 Given the extent of doctrinal detail that 
characterize other third party standing doctrines, and given the 
tens of thousands of class actions that the federal courts have 
adjudicated, one would expect a far more developed doctrinal 
foundation for this approach to standing in class actions. 
The “class as entity” theory treats the class as a whole, not any 
member (named or absent), as the relevant party for standing 
purposes.171 It has some doctrinal basis.172 In a series of cases dating 
from the mid-1970s, the Supreme Court refused to dismiss class 
actions when the named plaintiff’s claim became moot.173 This core 
holding found support in the Court’s insistence that, after class 
certification, the class “acquire[s] a legal status separate from the 
interest” of the named plaintiff.174 While arguably consistent with a 
“class as entity” theory,175 this line of decisions fits equally, if not 
better, with the notion that class certification simply involves the 
 
 168. Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125 (2004); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study 
Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 80 (1978); see also Brian Charles Lea, The Merits of Third-Party Standing, 
24 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 277, 277 (2015). 
 169. In Califano v. Yamasaki, the Supreme Court noted that “the Rule 23 class-action 
device was designed to allow an exception to the usual rule that litigation is conducted by 
and on behalf of the individual named parties only.” 442 U.S. 682, 700–01 (1979). A few courts 
have cited this statement in support of a claim that class action standing is a form of third 
party standing, whereby the named plaintiff enjoys standing to assert claims of nonparties. 
E.g., Adams v. Luxottica U.S. Holdings Corp.,  No. 07-1465, 2009 WL 7401970, at *2 (C.D. Cal. 
July 24, 2009). Califano did not involve standing, and the Court’s statement was not about 
standing. 
 170. E.g., 13A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
§ 3531.9.6 (3d ed. Aug. 2019 update). 
 171. Payton v. County of Kane, 308 F.3d 673, 680 (7th Cir. 2002); Vuyanich v. Republic 
Nat’l Bank of Dallas, 82 F.R.D. 420, 427 (N.D. Tex. 1979). 
 172. E.g., Payton, 308 F.3d at 680–81 (explaining the doctrinal basis for the “entity” 
theory). 
 173. U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 397–401 (1980); Franks v. Bowman 
Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 756 (1976); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 110 n.11 (1975); Sosna v. 
Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 401–02 (1975). See generally United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 138 S. Ct. 
1532, 1538–39 (2018) (discussing mootness line of cases). 
 174. Sosna, 419 U.S. at 399. 
 175. Neale v. Volvo Cars of N. Am., LLC, 794 F.3d 353, 364–65 (3d Cir. 2015). 
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joinder of individual parties.176 Moreover, other strains of standing 
doctrine fit the entity theory poorly. Most importantly, the named 
plaintiff does not recede into the class entity after certification; her 
individual standing remains relevant.177 
The various standing issues that arise in class actions are 
complex. Our claim that the absent class members’ juridical relevance 
resolves one of these issues may misfire or be inappropriate for 
another.178 All we argue here is that the juridical relevance of absent 
class members offers a straightforward solution to the injury 
difference problem that fits existing doctrine better than others. But 
to posit the juridical relevance of absent class members as a solution 
to the injury difference problem is one thing. To justify this juridical 
relevance is another. Here, the conflict resolution conception lends 
normative support. Litigation offers individuals a process they can 
use to resolve the concrete injuries each has suffered. These 
individuals pursue relief as discrete parties. By this view, a 
mechanism that aggregates claims together is not an alchemical 
exercise that transforms individuals into an entity of 
undifferentiated regulatory beneficiaries. The mechanism simply 
joins them and their antecedently determined legal identities to a 
case. 
 
 176. E.g., Franks, 424 U.S. at 756 (rejecting a mootness challenge on grounds that class 
certification joins “identifiable individuals” with live claims to the case); Chayes, Burger 
Court, supra note 16, at 28 (“In its encounters with class actions, the Burger Court has clung 
to the . . . conception of the class action as a congeries of individual claims loosely bundled 
together for purposes of judicial efficiency. For such purposes as . . . standing, the Court’s 
decisions tend to treat class representatives and members as classical individual claimants.”). 
 177. Martens v. Thomann, 273 F.3d 159, 173 n.10 (2d Cir. 2001); Mary Kay Kane, 
Standing, Mootness, and Federal Rule 23—Balancing Perspectives, 26 BUFF. L. REV. 83, 97–98 
(1976). 
 178. The other major standing issue involves the question of whether each absent class 
member must demonstrate his or her standing. The lower federal courts have taken 
confusing—arguably contradictory, arguably resolvable—positions on this issue. Compare 
Neale, 794 F.3d at 358–69, and In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790, 799–802 (5th Cir. 2014), 
with Theane Evangelis & Bradley J. Hamburger, Article III Standing and Absent Class Members, 
64 EMORY L.J. 383, 387–91 (2014) (“[S]ummarizing contradictory treatments of absent class 
member standing in the case law”). For a compelling account that maintains that the issue 
conflates standing, the requirements of the substantive law, and class certification, see 
Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, One Good Plaintiff is Not Enough, 67 DUKE L.J. 481, 544–46 (2017). 
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IV. BEYOND THE CLASS ACTIONS’ TWO CONCEPTIONS 
The two jurisdictional problems illustrate the limited value that 
the two conceptions of the class action have as guides to doctrinal 
design.179 A proponent of a powerful class action can use the regula-
tory conception to justify the juridical irrelevance of absent class 
members and thereby support a class action exception to BMS. But 
this basic commitment denies the proponent an easy answer, 
rooted in class member juridical relevance, to difficult standing 
questions that class actions prompt. A class action skeptic can 
invoke the conflict resolution conception to argue for class member 
juridical relevance and thus BMS’s application in class actions. But 
doing so effectively concedes away the injury difference problem 
and along with it standing as a barrier to class action litigation. 
We do not doubt the heuristic utility of the two conceptions, or 
the models they channel, as expressing in general terms ideas about 
what roles litigation can legitimately play. Nor do we challenge the 
benefit these or other dichotomous models offer as analytical tools 
for understanding and categorizing arguments about litigation.180 
But principled doctrinal design offers a combatant one of two 
choices. She can follow the implications of her baseline commit-
ment to one conception or the other to its logical doctrinal 
conclusions. Alternatively, she can embrace something other than 
a commitment to one of the conceptions as an underlying motivation 
for doctrinal design. We expect that few combatants in the long-
standing class action wars would accept the former. Can the latter 
yield doctrinal elaboration based on something other than mere 
preference? The regulatory and conflict resolution conceptions 
hardly exhaust the possible bases for engaging in a principled effort 
to fashion doctrine. But their normative limitations do highlight the 
challenge posed by reasoning from a set of foundational 
commitments fixed a priori. 
Principled lawmaking can proceed one procedural problem at 
a time, without concern for consistency with a vague set of 
theoretical priors. A pragmatic, consequences-oriented approach to 
doctrinal administration, after all, is in the DNA of modern 
 
 179. For another discussion of the normative limits of models of litigation, see Bone, 
supra note 37, at 954. 
 180. See also Bone, supra note 2, at 663–65 (describing the value of models of litigation). 
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American civil procedure.181 Pragmatism in doctrinal design takes 
seriously the basic objectives that animate particular requirements 
and asks how these requirements can best be administered to meet 
these objectives in particular contexts. If one context calls for absent 
class member juridical relevance and the other for their irrelevance, 
so be it. 
A pragmatic treatment of each jurisdictional problem counsels 
in favor of a class action exception to BMS and against a standalone 
jurisdictional threshold for the injury difference scenarios. The 
concrete adversity and separation of powers functions that standing 
doctrine performs make the latter a straightforward case.182 By 
limiting the federal courts to instances when parties have a genuine 
stake in a case’s outcome, standing doctrine ensures that issues get 
presented with sufficient precision in a rich factual context, that the 
most effective advocate of each side participates, and that litigation 
does not generate advisory opinions.183 Differences between the 
named plaintiff’s claim and the absent class members’ do not 
jeopardize any of these benefits. The class certification decision 
requires a finding that the named plaintiff will adequately 
represent the class, rendering the likelihood of ineffective advocacy 
remote. The case does not involve some abstract legal theory but a 
concrete argument that the defendant injured the class members in 
particular ways, allegations that place legal issues in a rich factual 
context. Differences between the named plaintiff’s injury and those 
of absent class members in no way create a risk of an advisory 
opinion, since all are indeed injured. 
Nor does standing’s separation of powers motivation require 
some standalone jurisdictional threshold. Ordinary conflicts over 
preferences for law and policy belong in political processes. 
Standing doctrine reserves the federal courts for those instances 
when an injury-in-fact gives the alleged victim a special right to 
pursue redress outside of ordinary democratic channels.184 If one or 
the other of the injury difference scenarios threatened to allow 
 
 181. See generally David Marcus, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Legal Realism as 
a Jurisprudence of Law Reform, 44 GA. L. REV. 433 (2010) (describing the connection between 
pragmatism and the original Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of 1938). 
 182. See Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 459, 465–92 (2008). 
 183. Id. at 468–72. 
 184. Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of 
Powers, 17 SUFFOLK L. REV. 881, 895 (1983). 
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fights over mere preferences, not injuries, into the courts, a 
standalone threshold would be wise. But it does not. Differences 
among injuries is not the absence of injury, standing’s central 
concern, but rather implicates concerns about the adequacy of 
representation afforded those seeking redress. Rule 23, of course, 
addresses this issue head-on. 
The injury difference problem threatens to create none of the 
mischief that standing doctrine protects against. Because the 
juridical relevance of absent class members makes the standing 
concern disappear, no reason exists to deny them this status. The 
juridical irrelevance of absent class members for personal 
jurisdiction purposes shares this justification. None of personal 
jurisdiction’s basic objectives requires a deviation from the 
decades’ old consensus rule, that the named plaintiff’s claim 
determines the court’s territorial reach. The juridical irrelevance of 
absent class members supports a class action exception to BMS and 
thereby protects against an unnecessarily crabbed administration 
of personal jurisdiction doctrine in class actions. 
Personal jurisdiction doctrine has several objectives, but it all 
flows from the basic principle that the exercise of jurisdiction must 
comport with “traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice.”185 Personal jurisdiction in the class action’s modern era has 
always depended on the relationship between the named plaintiff’s 
claim and the defendant’s forum contacts. In light of this history, 
unbroken until 2017, defendants can scarcely claim that “traditional 
notions of fair play and substantial justice,” long dormant, suddenly 
awoke to require that each class member’s claim measure up by the 
jurisdictional metric. 
The confused state of personal jurisdiction jurisprudence 
complicates an effort to enumerate all of the goals assigned to the 
doctrine, but in general terms two main objectives predominate.186 
First, limits on a court’s territorial reach ensure that the court only 
exercises adjudicatory power when the sovereign on whose behalf 
it acts has legitimate regulatory authority. International Shoe Co. v. 
Washington, the font of modern doctrine, expanded litigation’s 
 
 185. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
 186. Peter L. Markowitz & Lindsay C. Nash, Constitutional Venue, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1153, 
1173 (2014); see also Bradt, supra note 50, at 1179–80 (referring to the “power” and 
“reasonableness” theories of personal jurisdiction’s “main theoretical justifications”). 
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regulatory power.187 As the Supreme Court has narrowed jurisdic-
tional boundaries over the past several decades, it has tended to do 
so to privilege defendants’ volition. It emphasizes a defendant’s 
decision to affiliate voluntarily with a sovereign before litigation for 
purposes of the transaction at issue in the case, enabling defendants 
to choose where they risk litigation.188 
A class action exception to BMS does not license sovereign 
overreach. If the named plaintiff’s claim arises out of the defen-
dant’s purposefully created forum contacts, the forum state has a 
legitimate regulatory interest in the conduct giving rise to the claim. 
The class certification requirements ensure that the litigation does 
not force the defendant to defend fundamentally different conduct 
than what injured the named plaintiff. The case implicates only 
what the defendant voluntarily directed at the forum state. At any 
rate, concerns about sovereign overreach should weigh little in the 
balance unless the class includes people injured or residing abroad. 
As discussed, a federal court adjudicating a multistate class action 
exercises the federal government’s power and does not project one 
state’s sovereign prerogative beyond acceptable territorial limits. 
As a matter of law, the federalism argument against BMS’s applica-
tion in class action proves too much. But the idea behind it, that a 
federal class action simply does not have federalism implications of 
the sort prompted by state court litigation, is sensible and counsels 
against BMS’s migration into the class action’s domain. 
Personal jurisdiction’s second main function is to ensure that 
the exercise of adjudicatory power is reasonable. This determin-
ation includes attention to the burden the forum choice visits on the 
defendant, but it also assesses “‘the forum [s]tate’s interest in . . . 
the dispute,’ ‘the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and 
effective relief,’ [and] ‘the interstate judicial system’s interest in . . . 
the most efficient resolution of controversies.’”189 The undiffer-
entiated nature of the defendant decreases the likelihood that the 
forum state has any less of a regulatory interest in the defendant’s 
 
 187. Stephen Gardbaum, New Deal Constitutionalism and the Unshackling of the States, 64 
U. CHI. L. REV. 483, 558–61 (1997). 
 188. E.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). 
 189. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985) (quoting World-Wide 
Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292). 
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conduct than any other state.190 As for the burden on the defendant, 
the “unitary, coherent” case required by  Rule 23  lessens (if not 
eliminates) the gap between what the named plaintiff’s case alone 
foists on the defendant and what the class action causes. Finally, a 
single multistate class action surely compares favorably by an 
efficiency metric to several single state ones.191 
CONCLUSION 
The solutions to the personal and subject matter jurisdiction 
problems that this essay proposes may seem unprincipled. If absent 
class members are juridically irrelevant, their status renders BMS 
irrelevant. But juridical irrelevance creates standing problems 
when class member injuries differ. These problems disappear if 
absent class members are juridically relevant. But juridical relevance 
opens the door to personal jurisdiction concerns. 
Doctrinal design in class actions has never followed a rigidly 
principled course. The evolution of this doctrine has always had a 
pragmatic bent to it, as courts have tried to balance the claim-
mobilizing, rights-vindicating power the device promises with the 
demand that class actions remain true to basic assumptions about 
how civil litigation legitimately proceeds.192 The regulatory and 
conflict resolution conceptions of the class action have significant 
heuristic value, as they illuminate the many issues of public policy 
and institutional legitimacy that the class action implicates. But 
pragmatism, not these conceptions, should take center stage when 
new problems of class action administration arise. 
 
 190. A premise of general jurisdiction is that, because the defendant is “at home” in the 
state, the state has an ongoing regulatory interest in everything the defendant does. Allan R. 
Stein, The Meaning of “Essentially at Home” in Goodyear Dunlop, 63 S.C. L. REV. 527, 538–39 
(2012). Arguably, then, this “home” state has a superior regulatory interest. But, consistent 
with BMS, class counsel could file multiple single-state class actions and have them 
consolidated and transferred through the MDL system to any district court in the country. 
The MDL transferee court surely has no more superior regulatory interest than a court in 
which a multistate class action is filed. The only difference is that, in the latter scenario, class 
counsel picks the forum, while in the former the choice is up to the Judicial Panel on 
Multidistrict Litigation. 
 191. These cases would likely get consolidated and transferred through the MDL 
system. But the MDL transferee court is no more efficient than a single multistate class suit. 
The only difference has to do with who chooses the forum. See supra note 190. 
 192. Marcus, History Part I, supra note 3, at 591 (commenting on the “pragmatic 
balancing strategy” courts used to develop class action doctrine during its formative years 
in the late 1960s and 1970s). 
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